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Abstract
This chapter seeks to throw new light on the emergence of the Chinese economic middle class
using data from the China Household Income Project from 2002, 2007, and 2013. We find that
between 2002 and 2013 China’s income distribution was transformed from a pyramid shape,
with a majority having rather low income, to a more olive shape, as the middle class emerged.
Defining “middle class” as having an income high enough not to be regarded as poor but also
low enough not to be regarded as rich if living in a high-income country, we find that the share
of China’s population that was middle class was extremely small in 2002, larger but still less
than 10 percent in 2007, but it expanded rapidly from 2007 to 2013 to become one-fifth of
China’s population, equivalent to roughly 250 million people. China’s middle class remains
largely urban and is concentrated in the East; only a small minority of rural households and of
rural migrants living in urban areas is middle class. We use simulations to investigate whether
the growth of China’s middle class reflects across-the-board income growth versus a
redistribution of income to the middle, and to project growth in the size of the middle class to
2020. If all household incomes grow uniformly by 6.5 percent per annum to 2020, then China’s
middle class will almost double in size and in 2020 a majority of urban residents, but only 13
percent of rural residents, will be classified as middle class. We examine the characteristics of
China’s middle class and find it to be distinctive in terms of its sources of income, location of
residence, savings and consumption patterns, education, and Communist Party membership.
Keywords: China, middle class, income distribution
JEL Classification: D31, O15, O53, P36
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I. Introduction

One of the most significant global changes in this millennium is the substantial increase in the
number of households and persons in China with lives in economic terms similar to those in the
developed world. Most Chinese households no longer worry about how to meet daily living costs
and most have savings for a rainy day. Most own a home, and a growing number own a car and
can afford to take regular holidays away from home. This change is clearly revealed in studies of
worldwide income distribution. Milanovic (2016), for example, reports that the largest relative
gains in real per capita income by global income levels between 1988 and 2008 took place at the
middle and at the very top of the world’s income distribution. To a considerable extent, the gains
in the middle are the result of the recent changes in China. In contrast, income growth was much
slower in the segments between the middle and the top, reflecting slow income growth of
middle-class households in rich countries.
This chapter aims to throw new light on the emergence of the Chinese economic middle
class. We define “middle class” based on the level of a household’s disposable income. More
specifically, we define “middle class” as having an income high enough not to be regarded as
poor but also low enough not to be regarded as rich in a high-income country. This approach
allows us to consider the Chinese middle class with an external lens, relative to notions of the
middle class in the developed world, which we believe is ultimately the long-term objective of
China’s development process.
As a first task, we study the growth of the Chinese middle class from 2002 to 2007 and
then to 2013. We do this for China, and then separately for urban residents, rural-to-urban
migrants, and rural residents. As a second task, we simulate how the size of the middle class will
3

develop by 2020 under the assumption of uniform income growth of 6.5 percent per annum. The
results of this second task allow us to evaluate the extent to which China’s population will attain
the ranks of the developed-world middle class over the medium term. The third task of this
chapter is to investigate to what extent the middle class is distinct and differs from other classes.
We do this using detailed information from the 2013 survey of the China Household Income
Project (CHIP).
The emerging middle class in China has been the subject of writings by Chinese
researchers, most of whom lean toward the long tradition of class analysis in the field of
sociology. In contrast, there have been few attempts in China to map the middle class based on
analysis of household disposable income or consumption data. In our literature research, we have
come across only three such studies. Yuan, Wan, and Knor (2012) use the CHIP rural data for
1988, 1995, 2002, and 2007, and classify a rural household as belonging to the middle class if its
per capita daily expenditures are in the interval of purchasing power parity (PPP) US$ 4 to US $
20. Using this definition, the authors find that the middle class in rural China grew from 3
percent in 1988 to 53 percent in 2007. Bonnefond, Clément, and Combarnous (2015) use data
from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) for the years from 1989 to 2009 to study
the urban middle class using four different definitions, giving some priority to setting the lower
cutoff point at 10,000 RMB per year and the upper cutoff point at the 95th income percentile. A
cluster analysis for 2009 using household variables indicates that the urban middle class is
composed of a significantly higher proportion of households whose head belongs to the
professional and technical worker category, the administrative and executive category, or the
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office staff category. Somewhat more than two-fifths of middle-class households contain
pensioners. 1
The third study is most similar to ours. Different from the previous two studies, Chen and
Qin (2014) study China as a whole, and use the CHIP data for 1995 and 2002 and data from the
China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) for 2010 and 2012. Households with consumption
expenditures in the range of PPP US$ 10 to US$ 20 per person per day are classified as upper or
global middle class. According to this definition, the Chinese middle class increased from 1
percent in 1995 to 13 percent in 2012. Not surprisingly, the authors find that the proportion of
households classified as middle class was highest among urban residents who have an urban
household registration (hukou), followed by migrants living in urban areas, and finally by rural
residents.
Turning to our results, according to our definition we find that in 2002 middle-class
persons in China numbered 12 million, a very small minority of the population. Growth in the
middle class since 2002 has been rapid. The number of middle-class persons increased to 95
million in 2007 and further to 254 million in 2013. In the latter year, one-third of urban persons,
but only a small minority of rural and rural-to-urban migrant persons, was middle class. A
simulation exercise investigates the role of income growth versus redistribution in contributing to
this expansion of the middle class. For the period from 2007 to 2013 we find that if income
growth for all persons had been uniform and equal to the average, then the overall expansion of
China’s middle class would have been about the same as what in fact occurred; however, the
sectoral urban/rural composition of the middle class would have been somewhat different.

1

Bonnefond and Clément (2014) use the same definition and data to study body weight among Chinese
urban middle-class members. The authors conclude that only one subcategory (“the new middle class”—
the highest earners and the best educated) is relatively well protected from obesity.
5

China’s middle-class households differ from those with lesser means in various respects,
including their savings patterns, sources of income, ownership of consumer durables, geographic
distribution, and education. We also find that in 2013 the middle class was disproportionately
represented in China’s Communist Party. Looking ahead by means of a simulation that assumes
incomes for all households will grow at the uniform rate of 6.5 percent per annum (equal to the
planned growth of GDP per capita), we project that by 2020 the Chinese middle class will
roughly double in size, and as much as 60 percent of the urban population will belong to the
middle class. In contrast, the rural middle class in 2020 will remain relatively small.
In the next section, we discuss how the term “middle class” has been used by policy
makers in China and in academic research on China. Different from most of the other literature
on China’s middle class, our definition of “middle class” takes a global perspective. Here we
follow the approach in the literature on the international distribution of income, which we review
in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the data and our operational assumptions. Section 5 reports our
findings on the emergence of China’s global middle class from 2002 to 2013; Section 6 presents
an analysis of the growth of China’s middle class over time, with projections to 2020. In Section
7 we examine the characteristics of China’s middle class. Section 8 sums up our study and draws
some conclusions.

II. The Meaning of “Middle Class” in Policy Making and Studies on China

For many years the Communist Party leadership, policy makers, and researchers in China
discussed class in the Marxist-Leninist terms of workers, peasants, and intellectuals. The partystate did not acknowledge any social, economic, or political role for the middle class, and the
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ultimate goal was to create “a classless society.” During the reform era, however, views began to
evolve, and at the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2002 General
Secretary Jiang Zemin announced the goal to “control the growth of the upper stratum of society,
expand the middle, and reduce the bottom.” Thereafter, the CCP developed a state-sponsored
discourse on the middle class. The new objective was to achieve an “olive-shaped” middle-class
society, in which the bulk of the population would be economically comfortable (xiaokang) and
society would be harmonious. Goodman writes that this notion of a middle-class society is an
aspiration rather than a carefully thought-out idea, but identification of the middle class as a
potential driver of change is clear. “Individuals are being encouraged to pursue new ‘social
norms of middle class identity often defined around consumer practices.’ The new model citizen
is someone with high cultural capital and the economic capacity to consume” (Goodman 2014:
27).
The growth of the Chinese middle class can have significant consequences internationally
as well as domestically. A growing middle class means a growing market for consumer goods
and services. It also has potential implications for the geopolitical situation. The history of the
Western countries is sometimes used to demonstrate that the growth of the middle class is related
to the introduction and deepening of political democracy. For example, new research using panel
data from many developed and developing countries finds evidence in support of the hypothesis
that growth in the size of the middle class promotes institutional reform and democratic diffusion
(Loayza, Rigolini, and Llorente 2012; Chun et al. 2016).
Whether and how growth of a Chinese middle class will affect China’s political system,
however, is far from clear. For example, Tang (2011) finds that members of the Chinese middle
class (defined by occupation and self-identification) pay greater attention to politics and engage
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more than those with lesser means in informal/personal activities in response to conflicts with
government policies or officials. Other studies, however, conclude that the behavior of the
middle class in China as an aggregate is not significantly different from that of other classes
when it comes to political activities that require greater civic engagement or confrontation with
the political system. 2 If the CCP is able to successfully capture the interests of the middle class,
then growth of the Chinese middle class will not necessarily challenge China’s political system
in a fundamental way. Indeed, our data reveal that CCP membership disproportionately belongs
to China’s middle class (see Section 6). Nevertheless, even if growth of the middle class in China
leaves the political system intact, a larger proportion of middle-class persons in society could
change the political priorities.
Since the beginning of the new millennium, many sociologists have written about the
middle class in China. Li Cheng (2010) lists eleven prominent Chinese researchers who have
studied the middle class and their representative works. Work published in 2002 by Lu Xueyi,
then director of the Institute of Sociology at the Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), is
considered a landmark study for two reasons. First, for the first time Lu Xueyi categorizes most
of the working class as belonging to the lower or lower-middle strata. Such a categorization is
new, both politically and ideologically. Second, Lu Xueyi identifies a middle stratum comprised
of cadres, managers, private entrepreneurs, technical clerks, and private small-business owners.
Using data from 1978, 1988, and 1991 he estimates the growth among this group of people. Li
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Tang and Unger (2013) write, “The Chinese educated middle class has, as a whole, become a bulwark of
the current regime. As a consequence, regime change or democratization should not be expected any time
soon. The rise of China’s educated middle class blocks the way.” Nathan (2016) writes, “What middleclass persons dread is an economic or military crisis or an internal power struggle that triggers a
breakdown of order. It is the fear of such a crisis that explains why a middle class that increasingly
embraces liberal values still supports an authoritarian regime.”
8

Cheng (2010) also writes that in later work Lu Xueyi reports that the proportion of middle-class
persons in the Chinese population increased from 15 percent in 2001 to 23 percent in 2009.
Sociologists prefer to define the middle class based on occupation and employment, and
they often base the classification on more than one criterion. Different researchers have proposed
many varying definitions of middle class, which of course yields different pictures of the middle
class and has led to many debates. An issue in the sociological debates over the middle class is
whether the middle class is merely a statistical category or a class in a sociological sense. To be a
class in a sociological sense, members of the middle class must develop a coherent identity, class
culture, and sociopolitical attitudes and values, and perhaps may take some class-based political
actions. Several authors stress the heterogeneity of the Chinese middle class rather than referring
to the middle classes as one single middle class (Li Cheng 2010). Less attention, with the
possible exception of Mackerras (2005), has been paid to the possible ethnic diversity of the
Chinese middle class.
Economists and business researchers tend to focus on the relationship between the middle
class and consumption. Growth of the middle class in China is considered the driver behind the
changing consumption patterns and the rising demand for consumer goods. Regular visitors to
China have seen the stunning changes in the kinds of goods that are now offered to those who
have the means. China has turned into the largest market in the world for personal cars, and its
market for wine has increased dramatically. Similarly, China has seen a very rapid increase in
independent tourism (Chio 2014; Oakes 2016).
Middle-class status is also associated with housing and home ownership. During the
planning era, almost all urban households lived in rental apartments provide by their work-units.
Rents were very low, and so was the quality. This description no longer holds. Policies initiated
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by the government in the 1990s gradually introduced privatization of urban housing, as tenants in
urban China were given opportunities to buy their apartments at prices typically lower than those
in the emerging market. Today, the rate of home ownership in China is very high (Sato, Sicular,
and Yue 2013). Moreover, with a boom in the construction industry and the development of
residential real-estate markets, many more households now live in housing that is similar in
terms of space and quality to that of the middle class in rich countries. Some members of the
upper segment live in gated communities, visibly separated from people with lesser means (for
example, see Li Zhang [2010]).
In the literature on the middle class in the developed countries, studies have defined
“middle class” based on household disposable income, usually in relation to other households
within the same country. The various chapters in Gornick and Jäntti (2013) contain a wide
variety of definitions along these lines. 3 For example, a middle-class household can be defined as
having an income in the interval from 75 percent to 125 percent of the median. The only example
in this tradition that we are aware of for China is Anderson et al. (2016), which uses data from
six urban provinces and an econometric approach to define the poor, lower-middle class, uppermiddle class, and the rich. One feature of such an approach is that its definition of the middle
class is local, without reference to any universal standards or criteria. Such is not the case for the
literature we will discuss in the next section, and to which our study belongs.

III. The Meaning of the Global Middle Class

3

The book contains chapters by seventeen authors, and in it one can find twenty-one different definitions
of “middle class.”
10

For several decades researchers at the World Bank have defined poverty based on a global
poverty line measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). Since October 2015 this global
poverty line has been set at US$ 1.9 PPP per person per day, based on the latest round of PPP
estimates from the International Comparison Program in 2011. 4 The choice of the cutoff for this
global poverty line is based on an approximation of the poverty lines used in the poorer countries
in the developing world.
Several studies now also propose global cutoffs for middle and upper levels of the
income distribution. However, there is no consensus on where exactly to set these cutoffs, that is,
how much income a household should have to be considered a member of the middle class, let
alone the upper class. 5
One approach is to define the “middle class” as starting at the income level where
poverty ends. By this definition, people living in households with income just above the world
poverty line are classified as middle class. Among the more influential papers using this
approach is Banerjee and Duflo (2008: 26), which defines the middle class as living at between
US$ 2 and US$ 10 per day based on the 1993 PPP. Using microdata from thirteen low- and
middle-income countries, these authors investigate a number of aspects of the middle class and
conclude that “Nothing seems more middle class than the fact of having a stable, well paid job.
…The middle class … spend more on health and education of their children as well as on their
own health.” A similar, but not identical, approach is taken by Ravallion (2010), who defines the
developing world’s middle class as those who are not poor according to the world poverty line,
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https://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/270056-1183395201801/Summary-of-Results-andFindings-of-the-2011-International-Comparison-Program.pdf. Accessed March 24, 2017. See also Ferreira et al.

(2016).
5
In the relatively large literature on top-income earners, they are typically defined as those who belong to
the upper one-tenth or upper one-hundredth of the income distribution. See, for example, Atkinson,
Piketty, and Saez (2011).
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but would be considered poor if they lived in a high-income country. The latter is operationalized
using the U.S. poverty line, which was set at about US$ 13 a day in 2005.
A view espoused by other researchers, and shared by this study, is that a global poverty
line based on poverty lines in the world’s poorest countries is too low to be the starting point of
the global middle class. Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002), for example, define the middle class as
people having an income between the mean of Brazil and Italy. Bhalla (2007) postulates that
“middle class is where the poor end in the rich world” and puts the cutoff at US$ 10 PPP per
person per day. Following this, Kharas (2010), in a much-cited study, defines the global middle
class as those with daily expenditures in the interval from US$ 10 to US$ 100 PPP per person.
His lower cutoff is set equal to the average poverty line in Portugal and Italy, which is similar to
the poverty line in the United States. His upper cutoff is selected as twice the median income of
Luxembourg, the richest country in the European Union.
Unlike Bhalla (2007), Kharas (2010) uses data from 145 countries covering 99 percent of
the world’s population to estimate the size and regional composition of the world’s middle class
and, like Bhalla, he projects future change. Kharas concludes that in 2009 1.8 billion persons
belonged to the world’s middle class. A majority (54 percent) lived in Europe or North America,
28 percent lived in Asia Pacific, 7 percent lived in Central and South America, and 6 percent
lived in the Middle East and North Africa, whereas only 2 percent lived in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The results from his simulations indicate that the size of this middle class could increase to 3.2
billion by 2020 and 4.9 billion by 2030. Almost all this projected growth will come from Asia;
the size of the middle class in North America is projected to remain roughly constant as the
inflow to the middle class from households with lesser means will be offset by the outflow of
middle-class households to the rich class.
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[Table 3.1 about here]
As explained more fully in the next section, for our analysis we define four classes:
“poor,” “lower class,” “middle class,” and “upper class.” “Poor” refers to standards of living
that are poor by developing-country standards as measured by the global poverty line. “Lower
class” refers to a standard of living above this global poverty line but is still considered poor by
the standards of developed countries. “Middle class” refers to a standard of living that is
considered not poor but also not rich in the developed countries. Table 3.1 summarizes our
classification system and relates it to the terminology found in the literature, which we see as
differing between studies that use developing versus developed countries as the frame of
reference.

IV. Data and Operational Assumptions

We use data from the rural, rural-to-urban migrant and urban samples in the CHIP surveys for
the income years 2002, 2007, and 2013. 6 The samples were drawn from the larger household
survey samples of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) that are used to produce Chinese
official statistics on household income and consumption. Our 2002 sample contains 63,911
individuals, of whom 20,624 are from the urban sample, 37,969 are from the rural sample, and
5,318 are from the migrant sample. The 2007 sample contains 89,804 individuals, of whom
29,553 are from the urban sample, 51,847 are from the rural sample, and 8,404 are from the
migrant sample. The 2013 sample has 57,821 individuals, of whom 18,668 are from the urban
sample, 37,090 are from the rural sample, and 2,063 are from the migrant sample. The provincial

6

For an introduction to the household income surveys in China including the CHIP, see Gustafsson, Li,
and Sato (2014).
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coverage of the CHIP samples to some extent changes across the years of the survey, as do the
sampling probabilities. To control for this, in much of the analysis we apply the two-level
(region x urban/rural/migrant) population-based sampling weights developed by the CHIP team. 7
Following much previous work by the CHIP project, we use a definition of household
income that is based on NBS disposable or net household income data, adjusted to include
imputed rents from owner-occupied housing and implicit subsidies on subsidized urban rental
housing. This definition of household income is in line with international practices. The NBS
definition of income changed in 2013. For 2007 we carried out our calculations using the original
and the new income definitions, and we found very minor difference in our results. Therefore,
for simplicity, here we report our estimates based on the pre-2013 income definition for 2002
and 2007 and based on the 2013 income definition for 2013.
Income is the sum of various income components including wage earnings, net business
income, property income, imputed rental income on owner-occupied housing, and transfers net
of income taxes. We divide household income by the number of household members, adjusted
according to an equivalence scale to obtain income per capita in terms of equivalent persons.
For this purpose, we employ the equivalence scale used by Eurostat, with the first adult
equivalent to 1.0, additional adults equivalent to 0.5, and persons less than 14 years of age
equivalent to 0.3. Using the urban consumer price index for the urban and the migrant samples
and the rural consumer price index for the rural sample, we express income in constant prices

7

We use CHIP sampling weights that assume a middle estimate of the size of the rural-to-urban migrant
population.
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over time. In the calculations reported here, we do not adjust for spatial price differences within
China. 8
[Table 3.2 about here]
In our analysis, we use four classes, which we define by applying three cutoffs to the data
(Table 3.2). The lowest cutoff, set at PPP US$ 2 per person per day, defines the poor and it
relatively closely follows the recent practice of the World Bank when defining global poverty.
To convert to RMB, we use the PPP conversion factor of 3.76 for 2013, which is provided by the
OECD based on estimates from the International Comparison Program in 2011. 9 From this, we
obtain the cutoff in RMB per day, which is 7.52 for 2013.
The second cutoff separates the lower class from the middle class. Here we use as the
cutoff the level of income per capita that separates the poor from the non-poor in the EU in 2013.
Following the practice of the EU, we put the poverty line at 60 percent of the median income.
Information on the median income for sixteen member countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and United Kingdom) is reported by Eurostat 2013 at 18,219 € per person per year. 10
We then apply the PPP conversion factor, which was 0.83 in 2013. This yields a cutoff for 2013
of PPP US$ 36, or RMB 135.36 per person per day (Table 3.2).

8

We carried out the calculations with adjustments for the spatial price differences, which somewhat
changed the relative shares of the urban/rural/migrant populations in the middle class, but otherwise did
not substantially change our overall findings.
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http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/270056-1183395201801/Summary-of-Results-and-Findingsof-the-2011-International-Comparison-Program.pdf. Accessed March 24, 2017.
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We use the median for fifteen EU countries because it is covers those countries that have been longerterm, stable members of the EU and because this is the only multiple-country median that Eurostat reports
for the years prior to 2005, thus allowing us to conduct some sensitivity analyses using data from earlier
years. The median for the EU-15 is close to that for the EU-18, as well as for Germany, EU’s largest
member-state. In 2013 the median income of the EU-15 was 5 percent higher than the median income of
the EU-18 and 7 percent lower than the median income in Germany.
15

Definition of the middle class also requires a cutoff between the middle class and the
upper class. For this, we follow some other studies in the literature and use 200 percent of the
median household income per capita as observed in the fifteen EU countries, which in 2013
corresponds to PPP US$ 120, or RMB 451.2 per person per day. We carried out our analysis
using alternative cutoffs, such as 150 percent and 175 percent of the EU median income. The
results were not sensitive to the choice of this upper cutoff because the proportion of Chinese
households with incomes above these levels is very small.
Although our procedure for setting the cutoffs for the middle class relative to the median
income in the EU is conceptually clear, some details of the calculation may influence our
estimates of the size of the middle class in China. First, Eurostat data on median incomes is
expressed in terms of an equivalence scale that assumes a value of 1.0 for the first adult
individual in the household, 0.5 for other adults, and 0.3 for each person 14 years old and
younger. Such a procedure is typically not applied in low- and middle-income countries, such as
China, and it is not applied by the World Bank in setting the global poverty line.

The

justification for not using the equivalence scale for low- and middle-income countries is that the
scope for economies of scale in low- and middle-income countries is limited because, for
example, food consumption makes up a much larger proportion of consumption than it does in
rich countries.
In view of the fact that our cutoffs for the middle class are based on estimates of the
median income that use an equivalence scale, we apply the same equivalence scale to the
Chinese income data when estimating the share of China’s population that is middle class versus
upper class. Because the global poverty line is based on estimates of income per person, not per
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equivalent person according to an equivalence scale, we simply use income per capita when
estimating the share of China’s population that is poor versus lower class.
Second, comparisons over time require a decision as to whether to keep the cutoffs
constant or to let them change over time, that is, whether to use fixed or moving goal posts. We
have chosen to fix the cutoff goal posts at 2013 levels. In other words, we define middle class
with reference to the recent (2013) standard of being neither poor nor rich in the EU, and our
analysis investigates change in China’s middle class over time according to this recent standard.
Of course, this is not the only possible approach. An alternative is to allow the goal posts to
change and to base the cutoffs for 2002 and 2007 on the situation in the EU countries in 2002
and 2007, respectively. The results for this alternative approach, as shown in the Appendix, are
for the most part similar to those using fixed goal posts because income growth in the fifteen EU
countries from 2002 to 2013 was relatively modest.

V. Growth of the Chinese Middle Class from 2002 to 2013

Before turning to the results, we comment on how changes in the size of the middle class are
related to trends in income and income inequality, topics addressed in other chapters of this
volume. When the middle class is defined relative to absolute cutoffs, as is the case here, then the
middle class will expand when income growth for segments of the population below the middle
class is sufficient for them to cross into the middle class from below the cutoff, and to do so
more rapidly than any outflows from the middle class. Such an expansion of the middle class
may or may not reduce inequality. If most of the population is middle class, then the movement
of lower-income individuals into the middle class will likely reduce inequality. If most of the
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population is poor or low-income, however, and if the middle class is located near the top end of
the income distribution, then movement of some lower-income individuals into the middle class
could lead to rising inequality.

These hypothetical situations suggest that the relationship

between changes in the size of the middle class and inequality is complex.
As we will see below, China in 2002 began with an overwhelming majority of
households in the poor and lower classes, very few in the middle class, and extremely few in the
upper class. Thereafter, the country experienced rapid economic growth that was not equally
shared. During the period from 2002 to 2007 average income growth was rapid and the middle
class expanded, but the middle class remained a relatively small proportion of the population. At
this time, growth of China’s middle class was accompanied by rising inequality. From 2007 to
2013 incomes continued to grow and China’s middle class continued to expand, however, during
these years inequality began to decline, as reported in other chapters in this volume.
The relationship between inequality and growth of the middle class in China has been
rather different from that in the developed world. In the 1990s many countries in the developed
world had large middle classes, but in recent decades they have experienced unequal income
growth that mainly benefited those in the upper segments of the income distribution. Income
growth for those in the middle and lower segments has been slow. Consequently, many
developed countries have experienced a shrinking of the middle class accompanied by rising
inequality.
[Figure 3.1 about here]
Figure 3.1 shows how China’s income distribution has changed over time in relation to
our cutoffs between the poor, lower, middle, and upper classes. For ease of comparison across
time, income in all years is expressed in constant 2013 prices. In 2002 the income distribution is
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concentrated at the left side of the graph and resembles a “pyramid” shape. Most of the income
distribution is to the left of the cutoff for the middle class, and much of it is below the poverty
line. Moving to 2007 and 2013, the income distribution shifts to the right. Over time, the
relative size of the poor class declines and the lower and middle classes grow.
These findings are in line with the objectives of China’s policy makers, as discussed in
Section 2: Transformation from a society with an income distribution shaped like a pyramid to
one shaped like an olive, with few at the bottom, many in the middle, and few at the top. China’s
income distribution has indeed evolved toward an “olive” shape, although the pyramid’s peak
remains distinct and is in the lower class, well below the cutoff for the middle class.
[Figure 3.2 about here]
[Table 3.3 about here]
Growth of the middle class is visualised in a slightly different way in Figure 3.2, which
plots the cumulative distribution of income. The cumulative distribution of income shows the
proportion of the population with incomes below the level of income at each point on the
horizontal axis. For example, at the lower cutoff for the middle class (135.36), the curve on the
graph shows the proportion of the population that belongs to the poor and lower classes. Figure
3.2 has four panels, one for China as a whole, and one each for urban residents, rural residents,
and migrants. Each panel shows the cumulative distribution of income for 2002, 2007, and 2013,
with incomes for all years in constant 2013 prices.
One can see that from 2002 to 2007 and again to 2013, the cumulative income
distribution shifts downward and to the right. Such shifts indicate that over time the proportion of
China’s poor- and low-income population declined, whereas that with middle and higher
incomes expanded. The shift is most noticeable for the urban sector. For the rural sector, the
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curves shifted more modestly and remain largely to the left of the cutoff for entering the middle
class.
Table 3.3 provides the corresponding estimates of the share of the population in each
class by year based on our definitions. The Chinese middle class grew from only 1 percent in
2002 to 7 percent in 2007 and further to 19 percent in 2013. In terms of numbers of people, the
middle class contained fewer than 12 million Chinese residents in 2002. The size of the middle
class increased to 64 million residents in 2007 and expanded rapidly to no fewer than 254 million
residents in 2013. While in percentage terms China’s middle class in 2013 remained a relatively
small share of the population, in absolute terms and relative to the size of the world’s middle
class, it was large. 11
Concurrently with this growth of the middle class, China’s poverty rate decreased from
27 percent in 2002 to 11 percent in 2007 and further to 4 percent in 2013. The lower class
expanded from 2002 to 2007, when it exceeded 80 percent of China’s population, and then
declined to 77 percent. Despite the growing importance of China’s middle class, in all years it
was substantially smaller than the lower class, which constituted a large majority of China’s
population. As of 2013, then, an overwhelming majority of China’s population did not yet
belong to the global middle class.
The upper class was virtually non-existent in 2002, and in 2013 it remained small at only
0.5 percent of China’s population. The share of China’s population belonging to the global
upper-income class thus remains exceedingly small; however, in absolute terms the number is
still sizable (6.8 million). In view of the small proportion of the population above the highest
cutoff, in the following sections we focus our attention on the poor, lower, and middle classes.

11

Kharas (2010) estimates a global middle class of 1.8 billion in 2009.
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As one would expect, growth of China’s middle class is seen most clearly in the urban
areas. Among urban residents, the share of the population in the middle class increased from 2
percent in 2002 to 34 percent in 2013. 12 The share of migrants who were middle class expanded
from 1 percent in 2002 to 19 percent in 2013. In rural China, the share of the middle class in
2013 was still low at only 4 percent. Rural China, however, has been characterized by a rapid
reduction of poverty, from 40 percent to 7 percent, and by the expansion of the lower class from
60 percent to 89 percent of the population between 2002 and 2013.
[Table 3.4 about here]
How do our estimates of the size and development of the middle class relate to what
others have reported? Table 3.4 summarizes several previous estimates. As Yuan, Wan, and
Khor (2012) used the lowest cutoffs, it comes as no surprise that they report higher proportions
of middle-class persons in rural China than we or Chen and Qin (2014) report. Our estimates of
the size of the middle class in China as a whole are similar to those reported by Chen and Qin
(2014) and Kharas (2010). Kharas (2010) finds that less than 12 percent of the Chinese
population was middle class in 2009, which is the same as our estimate of 12 percent in 2013.
Chen and Qin (2014) report a middle-class share of 13 percent in 2012. The preferred estimate
of Bonnefond, Clément, and Combarnous (2015) for 2009 is substantially larger; however, this
reflects their low cutoff for entering the middle class. Their preferred cutoff of only 10,000
RMB per year translates to only 27 RMB per day, much lower than our cutoff of 135 RMB per
day.

12

In the Appendix, we report results from a sensitivity analysis in which we set the second and third
cutoffs in accordance with the changes in the median incomes in the fifteen EU countries developed from
2002 and from 2007, i.e., using moving goal posts. This alternative approach gives a growth of the middle
class in urban China from 2002 to 2007 that is faster than that reported in this section and a growth
between 2007 and 2013 that is slower than that reported in this section.
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Only Chen and Qin (2014) report the size of the middle class separately for the rural,
urban, and migrant sectors. For the most recent year (2012 for Chen and Qin, 2013 for us), we
find a smaller rural middle class and larger urban and migrant middle classes than they do. 13

VI. Analyzing the Growth of the Chinese Middle Class

To what extent is the growth of China’s middle class due to growth in average incomes versus
redistribution toward the middle of the income distribution? Both growth and redistribution have
taken place during the period of our analysis. As shown in other chapters in this volume, from
2007 to 2013 household income growth in China was broad-based. We also know, however, that
some redistribution took place, because from 2007 to 2013 income growth was more rapid in the
lower end and in the middle than at the top of the income distribution, as well as in the poorer
rural sector than in the richer urban areas.
In order to explore the role of average income growth versus redistribution, we carry out
a simulation exercise that begins with the 2007 distribution of income and assumes that from
2007 to 2013 all persons experienced the same annual growth rate of income. We set the
uniform annual growth rate at 7.97 percent, equal to the average rate of growth in per capita
household income during this period. This simulation yields a hypothetical distribution of
income for 2013 that assumes no redistribution of income. We then compare the size of the
middle class in this hypothetical distribution to that in the observed income distribution for 2013.
[Table 3.5 about here]

13

We note that our estimates are based on income, whereas those of Chen and Qin (2014) are based on
consumption expenditures. Another difference is that the estimates of Chen and Qin (2014) are for
households, whereas ours are for individuals.
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Interestingly, we find that the size of China’s middle class in the hypothetical distribution
is virtually the same as that observed in 2013. We also find, however, that this result masks some
differences in the composition of the hypothetical middle class versus the observed middle class.
Using the assumption of uniform growth yields a middle class in urban China that is
substantially larger (45 percent, not 34 percent), and a middle class in rural China that is
somewhat smaller (2 percent, not 4 percent) than that which was in fact observed in 2013. We
conclude that although redistribution did not affect growth in the overall size of China’s middle
class from 2007 to 2013, it increased the proportion of the middle class that was rural as opposed
to urban. These results reflect the relatively rapid growth of rural incomes vis-à-vis the growth
of urban incomes during this period.
A similar analysis going back further to the period from 2002 to 2007 also does not alter
the share of the middle class in the national population. The simulation, however, yields a much
larger reduction in rural poverty than actually occurred. A uniform growth rate would have
reduced the poverty rate in rural China to 9 percent in 2007, as compared to the much higher
observed poverty rate of 21 percent in 2007. These results reflect the relatively slow growth of
rural income vis-à-vis urban income during this period.
[Table 3.6 about here]
How large will China’s middle class grow in the future? We answer this question by
projecting forward from 2013 to 2020 under an assumption of uniform 6.5 percent income
growth per year for all households. We use 6.5 percent growth for the projection because China’s
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016‒2020) established a 6.5 percent target GDP growth rate and
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because this growth rate is in line with standard forecasts, e.g., the IMF predicts China’s GDP
growth will be 6.5 percent in 2016 and gradually slow to 6.0 percent in 2020. 14
The results from this exercise are reported in Table 3.6. A comparison with the numbers
in Table 3.3 indicates that in the seven years from 2013 to 2020, the share of the middle class in
China will almost double from 19 percent to 36 percent of the population, or from 254 million to
509 million persons (assuming population growth of 0.5 percent per annum). By 2020 most of
urban China will be middle class, with 60 percent of urban residents so classified. Reflecting the
persistent gap in income between the urban and rural areas, in 2020 rural China will still be
overwhelmingly lower class, with only 13 percent of rural inhabitants classified as middle
class. 15 In the near future, then, China’s middle class will remain a mainly urban phenomenon.

VII. Characteristics of China’s Middle Class

In this section, we use the 2013 survey data to identify the distinctive characteristics of China’s
middle class in comparison to the lower income and poor classes. First, we note that the Chinese
middle class contains relatively high savers, with an average savings rate of 35 percent. 16 Figure
3.3 shows the relationship between the savings rate and income using a plot of the median
savings rate by ventile of the income distribution. The median income per capita for each ventile
14

See the IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/.
Accessed March 24, 2017.
15
When digesting those results, it should be remembered that they assume that the income cutoffs
defining the middle class remain unchanged at the median income levels observed in the EU countries in
2013. To the extent that households in the EU experience income growth between 2013 and 2020, one
could argue that the criteria for being classified as middle class in China should be revised upwards,
which would reduce the projected share of the middle class in China in 2020.
16
The savings rate is estimated to be equal to the average savings rate among individuals. Each
individual’s savings rate is equal to its household savings rate. For each household, the savings rate is
calculated as household disposable income minus consumption expenditures, divided by household
disposable income.
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is shown on the horizontal axis. The vertical lines delineate between the poor and the lower
classes and between the lower and the middle classes. The median savings rate is negative for the
poor, increases from about 10 percent to 30 percent through the lower class, and then reaches
35‒40 percent for the middle class. Figure 3.3 indicates that expansion of the middle class may
not lead to a rising rate of consumption out of income, although the absolute level of
consumption might nevertheless increase.
[Figure 3.3 about here]
In the remainder of this section, we examine five sets of characteristics: a.) sources of
income, b.) housing and ownership of consumer durables, c.) location of residence, d.)
demographic and education characteristics, and e.) membership in the Communist Party. We find
that the middle class is distinct along many, but not all, of these dimensions.
Figure 3.4 shows the average composition of income for the middle class and each of the
other income classes in 2013. 17 The middle and upper classes differ from the poor and lower
classes in terms of the importance of income from wage employment. For the middle and upper
classes, wages contribute on average more than one-half of the total income.
[Figure 3.4 about here]
For the middle class, pensions are also a significant source of income, contributing 15
percent of income, compared to 9 percent for the lower class and only 5 to 6 percent for the poor
and upper classes.

Since pensions are typically linked to past employment, this further

underscores the central role of employment as a source of income for the middle class. Together,
wage and pension income account for 67 percent of middle-class income, as compared to about
50 percent for the upper and lower classes and only 18 percent for the poor. We note, however,
17

We calculate the share of income by income component for each household, and then we take the
average of the shares over the households in each income class. Consequently, the shares reported in the
figures do not add up to 100 percent.
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that the heavy reliance of the middle class on employment for income has declined over time.
Analysis of the 2007 data reveals that six years earlier the sum of wages plus pensions
constituted a substantially larger share (80 percent) of middle-class income.
The middle class also differs from other classes in terms of the relative unimportance of
income from household businesses. In 2013 business income on average accounted for 14
percent of middle-class income. For the other classes, business income was noticeably more
important, in all cases higher than 20 percent of income. We conclude that China’s middle class
is, in general, a salaried rather than an entrepreneurial class.

Business income is most

concentrated in the rich and poor classes.
[Table 3.7 about here]
Table 3.7 shows housing characteristics and ownership of consumer durables by class.
The differences in housing among the classes show up very clearly in the market rental values of
their housing (self-reported). On average, middle-class individuals live in housing that is valued
more than three times that of the housing of the lower class, and almost ten times that of the
housing of the poor. The upper class, however, lives in housing with an average rental value that
is double that of the middle class. Housing conditions, as measured by the presence of piped
water and a flush toilet, are nearly universal for the middle and upper classes but not so for the
lower and poor classes. Fuel used for cooking also differs considerably. Exceedingly few
middle- and upper-class individuals use firewood or coal for cooking, as compared to one-third
of the lower class and two-thirds of the poor individuals.
With respect to consumer durables, ownership of the two major household appliances,
refrigerators and washing machines, is widespread among the upper, middle, lower, and even
poor classes. Large differences emerge, however, with respect to other durables. Most of the
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middle class owns air conditioners and a computer with internet connections. These items are
almost universal for the upper class but are not typical for the two lower classes. Almost one in
two middle-class individuals lives in a household that owns a personal car; however, car
ownership is unusual among the lower classes. In terms of ownership of consumer durables,
then, China’s middle class is somewhat distinct from China’s lower classes and resembles the
middle classes in the developed world.
[Table 3.8 about here]
China’s middle class is geographically concentrated (Table 3.8); 90 percent of middleclass persons are urban residents (including migrants). Similarly, 90 percent of the upper class is
urban. In comparison, 85 percent of the poor are rural residents. Regionally, the middle classes
are concentrated in the East. Three out of five middle-class persons live in the East, as compared
to only one out of five of the poor. The upper class is even more concentrated in the East than
the middle class.
The geographic distribution of China’s middle class is related to the spatial variations in
levels of economic development and urbanization. To investigate this relationship, we calculate
the share of the middle class in each of the fourteen provinces covered by the 2013 CHIP survey
and plot it against the provincial per capita GDP, the provincial average disposable household
income per capita (as reported by the NBS in its statistical yearbooks), and the provincial rate of
urbanization (Figure 3.5). The graphs show the expected relations: the size of the middle class
increases with the provincial per capita GDP, the provincial average household income, and the
level of urbanization.
[Figure 3.5 about here]
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Note that Beijing is an outlier located far in the northeast corner of all the graphs. Not
only does Beijing have a substantially higher GDP per capita, income per capita, and
urbanization than the other thirteen provinces, it also has a markedly larger middle class. The
share of the middle class in Beijing exceeds 50 percent, as compared to 30 percent for secondplace Jiangsu. This gap in the size of the middle class between Beijing and the other provinces
reveals that impressions of China’s income distribution based on its capital city present a
misleading picture of the importance of the middle class in China as a whole.
[Table 3.9 about here]
With respect to demographic variables, the middle class is not very different from the
other classes (Table 3.9). China’s ethnic minorities are less frequently represented among the
middle class than among the other classes. Children make up a slightly smaller proportion and
adults make up a slightly larger proportion of the middle class than that in the overall population.
Education levels are relatively high for adults in the middle class, at 11.7 years, as compared to
8.7 years for the lower class and 7.6 years for the poor. In other words, completion of high
school is typical for adults in the middle class, as compared to completion of junior middle
school for adults in the lower and poor classes. Adults in the upper class, however, have
completed on average 13 years of education.
[Table 3.10 about here]
Communist Party membership is highest in the middle class. Table 3.10 shows that not
less than one in five middle-class persons is a Party member, compared with 16 percent of the
upper class and less than 10 percent of the lower class and the poor. Party membership is also
most prevalent among formal urban residents. Among China’s urban middle class, almost one in
four is a Party member.
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To what extent is the Communist Party a middle-class party? Table 3.11 shows the class
composition of Communist Party members. Overall, the majority of Party members (58 percent)
belong to the lower class; however, a substantial minority (40 percent) is middle class. In rural
areas, Party membership is dominated by the lower class; in urban areas, Party membership
contains roughly equal shares of the middle and lower classes. Together, the lower and middle
classes comprise 97 percent of Party members; the upper class and the poor account for the
exceedingly small remainder.

VIII. Conclusions

In this study, we propose a definition of the middle class based on household income per capita,
with reference to notions of the middle class in the developed countries. The middle class is
defined as having a per capita income that is high enough not to be classified as poor and low
enough not to be classified as upper class if living in Europe. The cutoff for belonging to the
middle class is 60 percent of the median income, and the cutoff for belonging to the upper class
is 200 percent of the median income in fifteen EU countries as observed in 2013. We subdivide
those with incomes below the middle-class cutoff into two groups. The poor are defined as those
living in a household with a disposable income that is below PPP US$ 2 per day. The lower class
consists of people with a per capita income above PPP US$ 2 per day but not high enough to be
classified as middle class.
Using these definitions, we measure the sizes of the middle and other income classes in
China in 2002, 2007, and 2013, and we trace the changes in their relative importance over
China’s period of substantial economic growth. We find that during this eleven-year period, the
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size of the middle class in China grew extremely rapidly, rising from 12 million people to 254
million people, at an average rate exceeding 30 percent per year. By 2013, then, the absolute size
of China’s middle class was large, equivalent to 80 percent of the population of the United
States.
This expansion of the middle class was accompanied by a change in the shape of China’s
income distribution from a distinct pyramid shape toward an olive shape but still with a marked
peak in the share of the population that falls in the lower-income class, which, at 77 percent of
the population, remained by far China’s largest class in 2013. Despite the rapid expansion of the
middle class, in 2013 the middle still constituted a relatively small share—only 20 percent—of
China’s population.
China’s middle class is very much an urban phenomenon. Most of China’s middle-class
persons are urban residents. Most of the rural population belongs to the lower-income class. A
clear majority of China’s poor live in the rural areas.
We have investigated how the characteristics of the middle class compare to those of the
other classes using data from 2013. The middle class earns most of its income from wage
employment and it is less involved in business and self-employment than the poorer classes.
Variations among the classes across some demographic variables are modest. Children, adults,
and the elderly make up proportions of the middle class that are similar to those of the overall
population. Education levels are noticeably higher for adults in the middle class than for those in
the lower and poor classes. We have found that the middle class is politically well integrated in
the sense that as many as one in five persons in the middle class is a member of the Communist
Party, a considerably higher proportion than among the lower-income class and the poor.
Nevertheless, the Communist Party continues to be largely made up of lower-class individuals.
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Looking ahead, we project that if household incomes grow at a uniform average rate of
6.5 percent per annum from 2013 to 2020, the proportion Chinese households that are classified
as middle class will almost double by 2020, reaching over 500 million and accounting for about
one-third of the population. If such an expansion occurs, which is not unlikely given recent and
expected rates of China’s GDP growth, then by 2020 Chinese will become the single largest
nationality in the global middle class. It is not unreasonable to assume that this quantitative
expansion will have consequences in terms of the evolution of the tastes and habits of middleclass consumers in other countries. We note, however, that China’s population will continue to
belong predominately to the global lower-income class.
It has been observed that growth of the middle class is important for China’s shift from
an investment-led to a consumption-led growth model. In fact, we find that China’s middle-class
households are large savers, saving on average more than one-third of their income and with
savings rates higher than those of the lower classes. Consequently, the expansion of China’s
middle class may not necessarily be an engine of consumption growth and could conceivably
hinder China’s shift to a consumption-led growth model unless it is accompanied by other
changes that alter savings behavior. Nevertheless, the expansion of China’s middle class will
reflect rising absolute incomes, so that even if the share of income spent on consumption
declines, the absolute levels of consumption will rise.

In addition, the composition of

consumption will likely change as the level of demand for items associated with middle-class
consumption in China (and elsewhere), such as housing improvements, household appliances,
electronic equipment, and automobiles, increases.
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Appendix. Alternative estimates of the size and growth of the Chinese middle class using
moving goal posts

Here we report the outcome of an alternative approach to define the Chinese middle class
whereby the cutoffs for the middle class are updated over time (“moving goal posts”). For the
year 2013 we use the same definition of middle class as in the main body of this chapter. For
earlier years, instead of adjusting the 2013 middle-class cutoffs back in time using the consumer
price index for rural and urban China, respectively, we set the cutoffs equal to 60 percent and
200 percent of the median income in fifteen EU countries, as observed in 2002 and 2007. The
median real income in fifteen EU countries increased between 2002 and 2007 as well as between
2007 and 2013, which means that the alternative cutoffs are lower than those in the main body of
this chapter, which are all based on the 2013 median incomes. The alternative cutoffs are
presented in Table A3.1.
Table A3.1. Alternative class cutoffs: Updated over time (moving goal posts)
USD:
2002(2001)

2007

2013

cutoff between the poor and the lower class

US$ 2/day

US$ 2/day

US$ 2/day

cutoff between the lower class and the middle class

US$ 26/day

US$ 31/day

US$ 36/day

cutoff between the middle class and the upper class

US$ 86/day US$ 105/day US$ 120/day

RMB:
2002(2001)

2007

2013

cutoff between the poor and the lower class

7.1

7.0

7.52

cutoff between the lower class and the middle class

92.3

108.5

135.36
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cutoff between the middle class and the upper class

305.3

367.5

451.2

Notes. The first cutoff is set close to the World Bank’s global poverty line. The second cutoff is set at 60
percent of the median income per equivalized person for the fifteen EU countries that prevailed in each of
the three years. The third cutoff is set at 200 percent of the median income per equivalized person from
the fifteen EU countries that prevailed in each of the three years. Because Eurostat did not publish
information on the median income of European countries in 2002, for 2002 we use the median income for
2001. Data for the median income of the fifteen EU countries is from Eurostat. US dollars are converted
to RMB using the PPP exchange rate.

The alternative estimates of the sizes of the middle class and the other classes for 2002
and 2007 based on these alternative cutoffs are shown in Table A3.2. By definition, the estimates
for 2013 are the same as those used in the body of this chapter.
A comparison of the estimates in Table A3.2 and our base estimates, as shown in Table
3.3 in the body of the chapter, reveals a very minor difference for the year 2002. For example,
the size of the middle class in China based on the alternative cutoffs is 1.2 percent instead of 1.0
percent according to our base estimates. More differences between the alternative and the base
estimates are observed for 2007. Under the alternative cutoffs, in 2007 7.8 percent of the
Chinese population would be middle class, as compared to 4.8 percent for our base estimates.
The difference for 2007 is particularly noticeable in terms of the size of the middle class in urban
China, which when using the alternative cutoffs is 20 percent of the urban population, as
compared to 12 percent as reported in our base estimates.
Thus, the alternative estimates give a larger expansion of the middle class from 2002 to
2007. From this it follows that the expansion of the middle class between 2007 and 2013 using
the alternative cutoffs was smaller than that for our base estimates. This sensitivity analysis
indicates that the timing of the expansion of the middle class from 2002 to 2013, especially in
urban China, is somewhat sensitive to whether the cutoffs in all years are based on the median
EU income in 2013 (fixed goal posts) or on the median EU incomes for each of the years
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(moving goal posts); however, the magnitude of the expansion over the longer period from 2002
to 2013 is not affected substantially.
Table A3.2. The shares of the four classes in China, and among the urban, rural, and migrant populations
calculated using the updated 2002/2007cutoffs (%)
A: 2002
All

urban

rural

migrants

poor

40.2

4.4

59.5

13.3

lower

58.6

92.5

40.2

85.4

middle

1.2

3.1

0.2

1.3

0

0

0

0

100

100

100

100

upper
All
B: 2007
All

urban

rural

migrants

poor

14.8

0.1

27.0

1.2

lower

77.2

79.4

72.5

93.1

middle

7.8

20.2

0.5

5.5

upper

0.1

0.2

0.01

0.2

All

100

100

100

100

Notes. In the calculations for this table we allow the goal posts to change and we base the class cutoffs for
2002 and 2007 on the median income in the fifteen EU countries in 2002 and 2007, respectively. The
cutoffs are shown in Table A3.1.
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Table 3.1. Classification of income classes, with comparisons to the literature

Classes Used in This
Chapter
Poor
Lower
Middle
Upper

Classes Used in the Literature:
Developing World Frame of
Reference
Poor
Vulnerable + middle
Upper middle + upper
Ultra-rich
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Classes used in the Literature:
Developed World Frame of
Reference
Ultra-poor
Poor + vulnerable
Middle
Upper + rich

Table 3.2. Cutoffs used in this study (per person per day, 2013 prices)
First Cutoff

2013 RMB
2013 USD

Separating the poor
from the lower class
7.52
2.00

Second Cutoff
Separating the
middle class from
the lower class
135.36
36.00

Third Cutoff
Separating the
upper class from the
middle class
451.20
120.00

Notes: The first cutoff is set close to the World Bank’s global poverty line. The second cutoff is set at 60
percent of the median income per equivalized person for fifteen EU countries in 2013. The third cutoff is
set at 200 percent of the median income per equivalized person from fifteen EU countries in 2013. Data
for the median income of the fifteen EU countries are from Eurostat. US dollars are converted to RMB
using the PPP exchange rate. For 2002 and 2007 the cutoffs are equal to the RMB cutoffs converted from
the 2013 prices into the 2002 and 2007 prices using the urban and rural consumer price indexes, as
published by the NBS.
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Table 3.3. The size of the four income classes in China as a whole, and among the urban,
rural and migrant populations, 2002, 2007, and 2013 (%)
A: 2002
all
urban
rural
migrants
poor
26.88
1.92
40.34
6.95
lower
72.15
95.65
59.44
92.32
middle
0.97
2.43
0.22
0.73
upper
0
0
0
0
all
100
100
100
100
B:2007
all
urban
rural
migrants
poor
11.3
0.09
20.58
1.05
lower
81.44
81.21
78.97
93.96
middle
7.16
18.49
0.44
4.74
upper
0.10
0.21
0.01
0.24
all
100
100
100
100
C:2013
all
urban
rural
migrants
poor
3.58
0.94
6.65
1.18
lower
77.29
63.71
88.93
79.02
middle
18.66
34.44
4.31
19.49
upper
0.47
0.91
0.11
0.32
all
100
100
100
100
Notes:
1) Calculated using weights. With weights, the urban/rural/migrant population shares are as follows:
2002: 33.65 percent /64.74 percent /1.60 percent; 2007: 34.51 percent/54.21 percent /11.28 percent; and
2013: 40.93 percent/45.77 percent/13.30 percent.
2) For 2002 and 2007 the cutoffs are equal to the RMB cutoffs in Table 3.2 converted from the 2013
prices into the prices for 2002 and 2007 using the urban and rural consumer price indexes as published by
the NBS.
3) The first cutoff (between the poor and the lower class) is applied to income per capita (equal to
household income divided by the number of persons in the household). The second and third cutoffs are
applied to the equivalized income per capita (equal to the household income divided by the number of
equivalent individuals in the household, see the text).
4) Here and elsewhere, we do not use spatial price deflators to control for the differences in prices
between the rural and urban areas and among the provinces.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data.
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Table 3.4. Estimates of the Chinese middle class in the literature

Author(s)

Definition of
the middle
class

Kharas (2010)

10‒100 USD
per person per
day

Bonnefond, Clément,
and Combarnous (2015)

Four different
definitions,
with a
preference for
10,000 RMB
per person per
year to the
95th
percentile

Yuan, Wan, and Khor
(2012)

Chen and Qin (2014)
(“upper middle class”)

4‒10 USD per
person per day

10‒20 USD
PPP per
person per day

Year of
measurement

2009

1989‒2009

1988
1995
2002
2007
1995
2002
2010
2012

This study

36‒120 USD
per person and
day

Size of the middle class (% of population)
Data
Merging
information on
household
income data for
deciles with
national account
data on mean
expenditures

Urban

Migrants

All of China

NE

NE

NE

Less than 12
percent

Approximately
50 percent of
the urban
households in
2009 may be
said to belong
to the middle
class

China Health and
Nutrition Survey
(CHNS)

CHIP
CHIP
CHIP
China Family
Panel Survey
(CFPS)
CFPS

2002
2007

Rural

CHIP

2013

3
5
15
53
<0.5
<1

NE

NE

NE

2
3

NE
2

1
2

5

14

10

8

9

20

14

13

< 0.5

3

1

1

<0.5

12

6

7

4

34

20

19

Notes: NE=not estimated. Estimates by Chen and Qin (2014) refer to consumption, not income, and the
percentage of households, not individuals.
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Table 3.5a. The simulated shares of the four classes in 2013, assuming that all individuals’
incomes grew at the same rate between 2007 and 2013 (%)
poor
lower
middle
upper
all

Total
4.01
76.38
18.71
0.90
100

Urban
0.02
53.16
44.57
2.25
100

Rural
7.25
90.62
2.08
0.05
100

Migrants
0.68
79.01
19.49
0.83
100%

Notes: This simulation yields a hypothetical distribution of income for 2013 that assumes income grew at
the same rate for all persons and there was no redistribution of income between 2007 and 2013. To
calculate the simulated shares, we start with the 2007 distribution of income and assume that from 2007 to
2013 all persons experienced the same annual rate of income growth. We use a uniform income growth
rate of 7.97 percent, which is equal to the average annual rate of growth of household income per capita
during this period. The urban/rural/migrant population shares are assumed to remain unchanged at their
2007 values. This yields the simulated income for each equivalent person in 2013. Using the cutoffs
shown in Table 3.2, we then obtain the share of the population in each class.

Table 3.5b. The simulated shares of the four classes in 2007, assuming that all individuals’
incomes grew at the same rate between 2002 and 2007 (%)

poor
lower
middle
upper
all

Total
6.16
87.59
6.19
0.00
100

Urban
0.13
83.77
15.9
0.20
100

Rural
9.38
89.5
1.11
0.00
100

Migrants
2.54
90.24
7.11
0.11
100

Notes: This simulation yields a hypothetical distribution of income for 2007 that assumes income grew at
the same rate for all persons and there was no redistribution of income between 2002 and 2007. To
calculate the simulated shares, we start with the 2002 distribution of income and assume that from 2002 to
2007 all persons experienced the same annual rate of income growth. We use a uniform income growth
rate of 14.71 percent, which is equal to the average annual rate of growth of household income per capita
during this period. The urban/rural/migrant population shares are assumed to remain unchanged at their
2002 values. This yields the simulated income for each equivalent person in 2007. Using the cutoffs
shown in Table 3.2, we then obtain the share of the population in each class.
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Table 3.6. The simulated shares of the four classes in 2020, assuming that all individuals’
incomes grew at the same rate between 2013 and 2020 (%)

poor
lower
middle
upper
all

All
1.70
59.81
36.18
2.31
100

Urban
0.65
34.36
60.31
4.69
100

Rural
2.86
84.20
12.50
0.43
100

Migrants
0.95
54.21
43.43
1.41
100

Notes: This simulation yields a hypothetical distribution of income for 2020 based on the assumption that
income grew at the same rate for all persons, and there was no redistribution of income. To calculate the
simulated shares, we start with the 2013 distribution of income and assume that from 2013 to 2020 all
persons experienced the same annual 6.5 percent rate of income growth. The urban/rural/migrant
population shares are assumed to remain unchanged at their 2013 values. This yields the simulated
income for each equivalent person in 2013. Using the cutoffs shown in Table 3.2, we then obtain the
share of the population in each class.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data.

43

Table 3.7. Housing and ownership of consumer durables by income class, 2013
Total

Poor

Lower

Middle

Upper

Estimated monthly market rent
of dwelling (RMB)

797

202

533

1 917

3901

Piped water in dwelling (%)

82.9

50.4

80.4

98.8

97.0

Flush toilet in dwelling (%)

60.9

20.9

54.6

94.2

94.9

Ownership of refrigerator (%)

82.6

54.0

80.7

95.4

97.9

84.3

69.2

82.2

95.4

100.0

47.5

19.8

41.3

77.5

84.6

27.6

66.2

32.2

2.1

2.4

40.6

14.0

33.8

72.9

81.8

20.2

9.3

14.6

44.2

74.3

Ownership of washing machine
(%)
Ownership of air conditioner
(%)
Main fuel for cooking is
firewood or coal (%)
Ownership of computer
connected to the Internet (%)
Ownership of private car (%)

Sources: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data; calculated using weights. Means are calculated over
individuals in each class.
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Table 3.8. Composition of the income classes by location in 2013 (%)
Sector
Urban
Rural
Migrants
Total
Region
East
Central
West
Total

Total

Poor

Lower class

Middle class

Upper class

40.9
45.8
13.3
100

10.7
84.9
4.4
100

33.7
52.7
13.6
100

75.5
10.6
13.9
100

80.3
10.6
9.1
100

41.5
31.5
27.0
100

20.9
34.6
44.5
100

37.6
34.0
28.4
100

60.4
21.0
18.6
100

85.4
9.9
4.7
100

Sources: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data using weights. Calculated over individuals.
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Table 3.9. Composition of the classes by demographic variables in 2013
Table 3.9-1: All
Ethnicity (%)
Han
Minority
Age group (%)
Child
Adult
Elderly
Average education among
adults (years)

All

Poor

Lower

Middle

Upper

93.1
6.9

87.2
12.8

92.8
7.2

95.6
4.4

92.4
7.6

15.1
75.9
9.0

17.3
72.6
10.1

15.4
75.6
9.0

13.4
77.1
8.9

16.4
79.9
3.7

9.3

7.6

8.7

11.7

13.0

Poor

Lower

Middle

Upper

89.7
10.3

94.0
6.0

95.8
4.2

91.5
8.5

15.1
75.0
9.9

15.5
75.8
8.7

13.6
77.3
9.2

16.3
79.9
3.8

9.1

9.7

12.0

13.3

All

Poor

Lower

Middle

91.5
8.5

86.7
13.3

91.8
8.2

93.7
6.3

15.3
75.5
9.2

17.7
72.1
10.2

15.3
75.5
9.3

12.3
81.3
6.4

7.8

7.3

7.7

9.4

Table 3.9-2: Urban (including migrants)
All
Ethnicity (%)
Han
94.5
Minority
5.5
Age group (%)
Child
14.9
Adult
76.3
Elderly
8.8
Average education among
10.5
adults (years)
Table 3.9-3: Rural
Ethnicity (%)
Han
Minority
Age group (%)
Child
Adult
Elderly
Average education among
adults (years)

Notes: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data. Calculated over individuals. Ethnicity is based on the
ethnicity information of each person, not the ethnicity of the household head. Age groups are defined as
follows: children (age<16); adults (16<=age<=65); elderly (age>65). The number of rural upper-class
observations in the sample is extremely small, so we do not report the rural upper-class characteristics.
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Table 3.10. Membership in the Chinese Communist Party by class and by urban/rural/migrant
in 2013 (%)
Total
Rural
Migrants
Urban

All
9.1
4.7
2.7
16.0

Poor
4.2
3.4
0.0
11.5

Lower
6.7
4.7
2.3
11.8

Middle
19.5
7.7
4.9
23.8

Upper
16.4
-

Notes: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data, with weights. The percentages refer to the share of
individuals who are members of the Communist Party. “All” includes all four classes. Due to the small
number of upper-class observations in the sample and thus the very few in each sector, we do not report
the breakdown for the upper class by urban/rural/migrant.
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Table 3.11. Communist Party members belonging to each class in 2013 (%)
total
rural
migrant
urban

All
100
100
100
100

Poor
1.7
4.9
0.0
0.7

Lower
57.5
87.8
65.3
47.0

Middle
39.9
7.0
34.0
51.1

Upper
0.9
-

Notes: Authors’ estimates based on the CHIP data, with weights. The percentages refer to the share of
individuals who are members of the Communist Party. “All” includes all four classes. Due to the small
number of upper-class observations in the sample and thus the very few in each sector, we do not report
the breakdown for the upper class by urban/rural/migrant.
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kernel density
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Figure 3.1. China’s income distribution in 2002, 2007, and 2013 (RMB per equivalized
person per day)
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Notes: Income in all years is expressed in 2013 constant prices. Authors’ calculations using the CHIP
data, with weights.
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Figure 3.2. Cumulative distributions of income for China as a whole, urban China, and rural
China, 2002, 2007, and 2013 (RMB per equivalized person per day)
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Notes: Income in all years is expressed in 2013 constant prices. Authors’ calculations using the CHIP
data, with weights.
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Figure 3.3. Savings rate by ventile in the income distribution, 2013
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poor
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-.1

-0.03
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Notes: Each bar gives the median savings rate for each ventile (5 percentile group) in the income
distribution. Labels on the horizontal axis are the median income of each ventile (in RMB). The vertical
lines indicate the income cutoffs between the classes. No cutoff is shown between the middle and upper
classes because the upper class constitutes only 0.47 percent of the population and thus is a small
component of the top ventile. Authors’ calculations using the CHIP data, with weights.
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Figure 3.4. The composition of income by class, 2013
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Note: Authors’ calculations using the CHIP data, with weights.
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Figure 3.5. The size of the middle class by province plotted against provincial GDP per capita,
household disposable income per capita, and the rate of urbanization, 2013 (%)
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Notes: Provincial GDP per capita, NBS disposable income per capita, and the share of the urban
population are based on statistics published by the NBS. Provincial shares of the middle class are
calculated by the authors using the CHIP data, with weights.
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